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Abstract 
This paper presents a legal-economic analysis of the Appellate Body’s decision that the WTO’s Anti-
Dumping Agreement (ADA) precludes countries from taking into account government-created price 
distortions of major inputs when calculating anti-dumping duties, made in EU-Biodiesel (Argentina). 
In this case, the EU made adjustments to the price of biodiesel’s principal input – soybeans – in 
determining the cost of production of biodiesel in Argentina. The adjustment was made based on the 
uncontested finding that the price of soybeans in Argentina was distorted by the existence of an export 
tax scheme that resulted in artificially low soybean prices. The Appellate Body found that the EU was 
not permitted to take tax policy-induced price distortions into account in calculating dumping margins. 
We analyze the economic rationale for Argentina’s export tax system, distortions in biodiesel markets 
in Argentina and the EU, and the remaining trade policy options for addressing distorted international 
prices. We also assess whether existing subsidies disciplines would be more effective in addressing 
this problem and conclude that they would not. 
Keywords 
WTO, anti-dumping, export tax, cost adjustment, government distortion, subsidy 
JEL Classification: F13, F53. 
 
  1 
I. Introduction 
The dispute between the EU and Argentina over the application of European antidumping duties on 
biodiesel imported from Argentina raises big questions about the functioning of the WTO Agreements 
when confronted with problems that are not explicitly addressed in the treaty text or that may fall in 
the cracks between the WTO’s Agreement on Anti-dumping (ADA) and its Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (SCM). In this case, an economic policy by one country (Argentina) had 
a trade-distorting effect that was similar to a production subsidy, but it was not clear what legal 
provisions of the WTO were most appropriate for addressing and offsetting the underlying price 
distortion. Anti-competitive practices by private firms that lead to distorted international prices are 
typically addressed by the imposition of anti-dumping duties, consistent with the ADA. In contrast, 
government intervention that confers financial benefits on exporting firms and distorts international 
prices is typically addressed through the application of countervailing duties under the SCM 
Agreement. A narrow legal interpretation of either the ADA or the SCM could leave an importing 
country with no options to address low-priced imports that harm domestic producers when those low 
prices are caused by distortions in markets for inputs. 
The meta-problem highlighted by this case is the interaction of market economies with non-market 
economies. A distortion affecting prices in one sector of the economy that is caused by a government 
policy can pass-through into the prices of internationally traded goods. Thus, a case could be made for 
some kind of trade remedy in the importing country. However, the letter of the WTO law is not well-
suited to analyzing distortions that are one or two degrees removed from the internationally traded 
good. Assessing the impact of a market intervention that is one or two degrees away from the 
internationally trade good requires the use of econometrics. Methodologies for assessing dumping 
margins have been the focal point of a number of trade remedy disputes.
1
 The WTO agreement will 
continue to face challenges arising from not only the “Non-Market Economy” status of some WTO 
members, but also with issues that could arise for vertically integrated global firms and for firms in 
vertically-structured industries.  
Interestingly, the addendum to the AB Report summarizing the third party submissions in this case 
demonstrates that support for Argentina compared to the EU appears to follow a strict party line in 
which the more market-based economies with lower levels of government intervention supported the 
EU’s position (e.g. the US) whereas the economies characterized by extensive government 
involvement in markets favored Argentina’s arguments (e.g. Saudi Arabia and China).  
Our analysis focuses on what we see as the most important aspect of the dispute and the AB’s 
ruling – the use of alternative data to construct production costs for an exporter.2 
This dispute follows a long line of WTO challenges to anti-dumping measures where the heart of 
the challenge relates to adjustments to prices made by the investigating authorities (here, the European 
Commission) to data presented to it by exporting producers.
3
 In this case, the EU imposed anti-
dumping duties on imports of biodiesel fuel exported from Argentina, where soybeans were the 
                                                     
1
 See Horn and Mavroidis (2006), Bown and Sykes (2008), Prusa and Vermulst (2009) and Crowley and Howse (2010) for 
a discussion of challenges to dumping methodologies in previous WTO disputes. 
2
 While the AB report included findings with respect to the WTO constituency of certain provisions of the EU’s Basic 
Antidumping regulation, the amount of dumping duties imposed and the EU’s reliance on certain capacity data as part of 
its injury findings, with the exception of Table 1, we leave those issues aside.  
3
 Other legal-economic assessment of related disputes in this series include BOWN, C., & SYKES, A. (2008). The Zeroing 
Issue: A critical analysis of Softwood V. World Trade Review, 7(1), 121-142. doi:10.1017/S1474745607003564; Horn, 
H., & Mavroidis, P. (2006). European Community – Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings 
from Brazil (WT/DS219/AB/R: DSR 2003:VI, 2613). World Trade Review, 5(S1), 87-129. 
doi:10.1017/S1474745606001418.  
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primary input material used by Argentine biodiesel producers. In constructing a home (i.e. Argentine) 
market price for Argentine biodiesel, the Commission chose to adjust the price of soybeans in order to 
compensate for the distortion in soybean prices caused by an export tax scheme imposed on soybeans, 
soybean oil and biodiesel by the Argentine government. There was no dispute that Argentina used this 
tax to discourage exports of soybeans and to keep the price of soybeans low; the data on record shows 
Argentine soybean prices were about 35 percent below international soybean prices.
4
 A lower price for 
soybeans implies a lower margin of dumping than would have been the case if Argentine producers 
had paid the international or a non-distorted price for soybeans.  
This case thus raises the question of whether the WTO’s Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) permits 
countries to take government-created distortions to the price of major inputs into account when 
calculating the home-market price of allegedly dumped goods. The answer from the Appellate Body is 
no and that answer likely has significant implications not only for this case but for all cases in which 
investigating authorities are faced with distorted home market prices, particularly in non-market 
economies such as China and Vietnam. 
In this article, we begin with an analysis of the legal and economic merits of the case presented to 
the AB for resolution. We then proceed to a counterfactual discussion of whether the economic 
situation involving Argentine biodiesel should have proceeded in the EU as an anti-subsidy case. 
Interestingly, an anti-subsidy case was filed almost simultaneously with the antidumping case. 
However, the anti-subsidy case was withdrawn by the European domestic producers and terminated by 
the Commission shortly after the Commission issued its final determination to impose antidumping 
duties. In discussing the subsidy issues at play in this case, we point out an important gap in the 
current WTO rules governing the interaction of market and non-market economies.  
II. Background of the EU Antidumping Measure on Biodiesel 
In August 2012, the European Biodiesel Board (EBB), representing biodiesel producers in Europe, 
filed a complaint contending that imports of biodiesel from Argentina and Indonesia were being sold 
in Europe for less than they sold for at home and that these low-priced imports were injuring European 
biodiesel producers. In most dumping cases, the amount of dumping is determined by comparing the 
price at which the good is sold in its home market (Normal Value) with the price at which it is sold in 
the importing country.
 5
 However, the ADA permits Investigating Authorities (IAs) to depart from 
using home market sales prices: 1) when there are no home market sales of the product “in the 
ordinary course of trade,” or 2) when a particular market situation or a low volume of sales does not 
permit a proper comparison. (ADA Art. 2.2) Here, the EBB contended (and the Commission found) 
that the Argentine involvement in regulating all aspects of biodiesel production was so extensive that 
domestic prices for sales of biodiesel could not be used to determine the Normal Value (i.e., they were 
no sales “in the ordinary course of trade”).6 Because all dumping determinations involve a comparison 
                                                     
4
 The Argentines challenged European assumptions about what the international, world-market price would have been in 
the absence of the Argentine export tax system. We take this up in Sections III and VI below.  
5
 Dumping is considered to have occurred whenever thde Export Price is below the Normal Value (or home-market price) 
of a good. For example, if biodiesel sold for $10 per gallon in Argentina but sold for $7 per gallon in Europe, dumping in 
the amount of $3 per gallon would be found. Anti-dumping duties equal to the amount of dumping can be imposed if an 
Investigating Authority also determines that the dumped imports caused material injury to the domestic producers of the 
good. A low (potentially dumped) price confers an economic benefit to consumers in Europe, but harms EU biodiesel 
producers forced to compete with a significant volume of low-priced imports. The Commission’s (and the WTO ADA's) 
viewpoint that low prices are a problem assumes that EU producers’ well-being is more important than that of EU 
consumers. This is a normative question that we set aside for the moment.  
6
 The EU asserted and no party contested that sales in Argentina were not “in the ordinary course of trade.” As such, 
neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body attempted to further define “ordinary course of trade,” nor were the other bases 
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between Normal Value and the Export Price of a good, the Commission was forced to look to 
alternatives to the sales prices in Argentina to determine a Normal Value. The ADA provides for two 
basic alternatives to the use of home market sales prices: 1) prices for sales in a third country market 
or 2) the cost of production (COP) plus selling, general and administrative expenses plus a reasonable 
profit. The Commission opted to use the COP alternative to construct a Normal Value. 
To conduct its COP analysis, the Commission was required to determine the price of the key inputs 
used in Argentina to make biodiesel. Chief among these was soybeans and soybean oil. In the 
preliminary phase of its investigation, the Commission stated that it did not have sufficient 
information to address the EBB’s contention that the price of soybeans and soybean oil was itself too 
distorted to be used in determining the cost of production for biodiesel but that it would take up the 
issue in the final, definitive stage of the investigation. Therefore, for its provisional decision, the 
Commission used the cost of soybeans and soybean oil as reflected in the books and records of the 
selected Argentine producers (i.e., the distorted input price) and on that basis, found that biodiesel 
from Argentina had been dumped in Europe at margins of dumping ranging from 6.8% to 10.6%.  
In the final phase of its investigation, the Commission examined the domestic prices of soybeans 
and soybean oil and found: 1) that Argentina’s export tax system resulted in prices for soybeans that 
were considerably below the international price, and 2) that the reference price used by the Argentine 
government to calculate the export tax on soybeans reflected the international price of soybeans. As a 
result, the Commission decided to use the Argentine reference price (minus certain transport “fobbing” 
costs) in lieu of the actual prices paid by Argentine producers when determining the cost of the raw 
materials used to produce biodiesel. The Commission reasoned that this reference price is what 
“would have been the price paid . . . in the absence of the export tax system.”7 As a result of using 
these reference prices, the Commission found much higher margins of dumping than in the 
preliminary phase, with dumping margins ranging from 41.9% to 49.2%.
8
  
How and why were the home market prices of Argentine biodiesel distorted? The basic economics 
suggest that the price of Argentine biodiesel was low relative to what it would have been in the 
absence of the export taxes on soybeans and soybean products. Biodiesel’s primary input is soybeans 
(75-80% of costs) which were very cheap in Argentina because the Argentine government applied a 
high export tax on raw soybeans and a lower export tax on biodiesel, a higher-value added commodity. 
This Argentine policy presumably was designed to have two effects; first, by placing a higher tax on 
the raw commodity than on a more processed good, the Argentine government was attempting to raise 
the value-added component of Argentina’s exports and aid the economy in moving up the value chain 
in its exports; second, by putting downward pressure on the domestic price of the primary input into 
biodiesel, raw soybeans, the government policy was a directed financial transfer to biodiesel producers 
at the expense of soybean farmers. In other words, the government offered biodiesel producers a de 
facto production subsidy (a financial benefit that was specific to the industry), but the cost of this 
subsidy program was borne by sellers of soybeans who received low, tax-distorted prices. By 
structuring the intervention as an export tax on an input rather than a direct production subsidy (a 
subsidy to purchasing the input), the cost of the program appeared on the government balance sheet as 
tax revenue (rather than an expenditure), yet still conferred benefits that were clearly specific to a 
single industry – biodiesel production.9 
(Contd.)                                                                  
for departing from the use of Normal Value (“particular market situation” or “low volume of sales”) addressed in this 
dispute. 
7
 AB Report, para. 5.8, referring to Panel Report, para. 7.257 and Definitive Disclosure (Panel Exhibit ARG-35) para. 32.  
8
 Because the EU applies a lesser duty rule and the Commission found that the injury margins were at rates ranging from 
22% to 25.7%, those lesser rates were the rates definitively applied by the EU rather than the 41.9% to 49.2% dumping 
margins. 
9
 The question of who bore the burden of (i.e. paid) the export tax on soybeans depends on the conditions of competition in 
the international market for soybeans, that is, the elasticities of export supply and import demand. We take this up further 
in section VI.  
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III. Does the Anti-Dumping Agreement Permit the Use of Alternatives to Actual Costs? 
The heart of the dispute between the EU and Argentina rests on the disparate views of what data 
investigating authorities (IAs) conducting anti-dumping investigations are required to use when 
determining the Normal Value of allegedly dumped goods. Argentina’s basic contention is that ADA 
requires IAs to use the actual prices paid for goods in the country of origin, no matter how distorted or 
far from “reality” such prices might be. If the prices are reflected in actual books and records of 
companies as what they actually paid for inputs, then the IA must rely on them. The EU, on the other 
hand, claims that there is an overarching standard of reasonableness that permits IAs to look elsewhere 
when the actual prices are not reasonable and that IAs are not required to blindly follow actual prices 
paid if those prices bear no rational relationship to a “real” price due to government interventions that 
distort the actual prices.
10
  
As such, the dispute centers on the interpretation of two provisions found in ADA Article 2:  
1) Article 2.2, which permits IAs to abandon home market sales prices when, among others, there 
are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade and to look to alternatives for 
determining Normal Value, including the “cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable 
amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits,” which are often lumped together 
as simply the Cost of Production (COP). There was no dispute in this case over the EU decision not to 
use home market sales prices or to the decision to opt for a COP analysis. Rather the dispute centered 
on the COP assumptions and methodology used by the EU. 
The Argentines never contested that their tax policy reduced the domestic price of soybeans. In 
fact, their position during the EU’s original investigation was two-fold: first, the export tax system was 
permitted under WTO rules and, second, the resulting low input prices were most appropriately seen 
as “the natural competitive advantage of the Argentine producers.”11 In their view, the tax system 
conferred on Argentine producers a fair competitive advantage that created real welfare gains for the 
Argentine firms’ European customers. Throughout the EU’s original antidumping investigation and 
the WTO dispute, Argentina argued that the Commission was incorrectly interpreting the ADA and 
was wrong to use international soybean prices in constructing the cost of domestic biodiesel 
producers.  
The legal issue under Article 2.2 was whether the EU, in using a reference price established by the 
Argentine government based on international prices, had correctly found the COP in Argentina, the 
country of origin. The EU contended that the soybean prices it used reflected the soybean costs that 
the producers of biodiesel would pay in Argentina absent the distortion caused by the Argentine export 
tax system. As such, the EU argued that these prices were costs “in the country of origin” within the 
meaning of ADA Article 2.2. 
Argentina, on the other hand, submitted that the phrase in Article 2.2 “cost of production in the 
country of origin” refers only to expenses incurred in the production of the product at issue in the 
country of origin, which can only be determined by using information and evidence from the country 
of origin—and not through the use of international prices or outside benchmarks. 
In its analysis, the Appellate Body first rejected the basic notion that outside information or 
evidence can never be used to determine COP inside the country of origin. It then established the 
following test: “when relying on any out-of-country information to determine the cost of production in 
                                                     
10
 The EU concluded that “the domestic prices of the main raw material used by biodiesel producers in Argentina were . . . 
lower than the international prices due to the distortion created by the Argentine export tax system and, consequently, the 
costs of the main raw material were not reasonably reflected in the records kept by the Argentinean producers.” Panel 
Report, para. 7.181.  
11
 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1194/2013 in Official Journal of the European Union L 315/6(41) of 26 
November 2013.  
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the country of origin under Article 2.2, an investigating authority has to ensure that such information is 
used to arrive at the ‘cost of production in the country of origin’, and this may require the 
investigating authority to adapt that information.” (para. 6.82, emphasis added). As such, the Appellate 
Body is stating that the only permitted analysis is one that ends with the cost of production in the 
country of origin. As such, it appears that the right to use outside information may have been given 
with one hand, while, as a practical matter, been taken away with the other, as it is likely to be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for an IA to meet the Appellate Body’s test. Any IA wishing to 
rely on outside information bears the burden of showing that any outside information used nonetheless 
results in a determination of prices inside the country of origin. How is an IA supposed to make such a 
showing? It is precisely because prices inside a country are unavailable or not usable or distorted that 
the IA would have turned to outside benchmarks in the first place. Moreover, it is not clear what the 
Appellate Body means by “arrives at.” If it means that the outside information must produce a cost 
that is equal to the inside country price, then there would be no reason to resort to outside information 
or prices if the result must be the same. If the prices or costs inside the country of origin are distorted, 
it is not clear why the IA should be required to “arrive at” that same distorted price. 
Indeed, the Appellate Body’s reasoning with respect to Article 2.2 appears to be the ultimate 
Catch-22. The Appellate Body notes that the EU opted to use a surrogate price for soybeans precisely 
because the surrogate price did not represent the cost for soybeans in Argentina (which the EU had 
found to be distorted due to the export tax scheme) but then found that the EU violated Article 2.2 
because the surrogate used did not represent the cost of soybeans in Argentina. It is hard to imagine 
how any IA would ever be able to prove that the domestic prices cannot be used due to distortions or 
unavailability and at the same time find a surrogate price that it can prove represents those same 
domestic prices (presumably as they would have been absent distortions). 
Two distinct and important issues were confounded by the AB’s Catch-22 ruling. First, what is 
dumping? In other words, are exporters dumping if they set prices to maximize profits given a locally 
available input price? Or, if an input price is favorably distorted by a government policy, does this 
automatically imply dumping by a profit-maximizing firm? Second, what guidance does the treaty 
provide on how an Investigating Authority determines the cost of production of an exported good? 
Does it provide any guidance on how to determine the “true” price of an input in the presence of a 
distortive tax or subsidy? In other words, is this entire line of analysis conducted by the EU permitted 
under Article 2.2?  
The answer to the first question requires an almost philosophical response; most economists object 
to the legal definition of dumping provided by Article 2.2 and instead interpret “dumping” to refer to 
an anticompetitive behavior by a firm that is intended to eliminate competitors or increase a firm’s 
market power so that the firm can raise prices in the future. Economists condemn anti-competitive 
practices but generally approve of pricing strategies, such as temporarily pricing below cost, that are 
prohibited by Article 2.2. Viewed in this light, the prices of Argentine biodiesel producers were the 
outcome of normal profit-maximizing behavior and did not constitute dumping in the anticompetitive 
behavior sense. However, if an economic analysis were premised on the Article 2.2 definition of 
dumping as pricing below cost, the question of how to construct cost appropriately becomes relevant. 
The Argentine view was that the price of soybeans in Argentina, inclusive of the effect of any taxes, 
was the relevant price for determining costs. From an accounting perspective, the prevailing price of 
the input inclusive of taxes and subsidies would be the correct price for determining the firm’s profits. 
Logically, that same input price should be used for other analyses.  
However, the problem that arises with using the prevailing price of the primary input in the country 
of origin to construct costs is that it ignores the trade-distorting impact of the actions of the Argentine 
government. This leads to the second question, how should an Investigating Authority determine the 
price of an input for constructing costs and estimating dumping margins? The convoluted language of 
the AB seems to rule out using information other than local information precisely when local market 
information is unavailable. Into this information vacuum, the remaining option the AB inadvertently 
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left on the table is an econometric approach to estimating the input price in the country of origin. An 
econometric approach would use Argentine data to estimate the export supply elasticity facing 
Argentina together with information on the local tax program to estimate the local input price in the 
absence of the tax program. Interestingly, the procedure the Commission followed, which ignored 
econometrics and used the international market price as the reference price for soybeans, would have 
arrived at the same conclusion as an econometric analysis if the global export supply of soybeans were 
perfectly elastic. If Argentina faced an almost perfectly elastic export supply curve, the domestic price 
of soybeans in the absence of Argentina’s export tax policy would have been equal to the international 
price.
12
 
2) Article 2.2.1.1, which explains how the COP is to be determined, specifically states that “cost 
shall normally be calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter or producer . . . provided that 
such records are in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles of the exporting 
country and reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under 
consideration.” (ADA Art. 2.2.1.1). 
The dispute here centered on the second condition for using the books and records of the exporter 
or producer—that they reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the 
product under consideration. The EU contended that this phrase permits an IA to examine the 
“reasonableness” of the costs themselves, noting that the costs referred to in Art. 2.2.1.1 “must 
themselves be ‘reasonable’ if the records are to reasonably reflect them.” (para. 6.35). Argentina, for 
its part, contended that the IA is only permitted to examine the reliability and accuracy of the costs 
reported in the records to ensure that they reflect the actual costs paid by the producer or exporter. For 
Argentina, Article 2.2.1.1 does not allow an IA to assess whether the recorded costs meet some 
general standard of “reasonableness” through a comparison with hypothetical costs that might prevail 
in a hypothetical market, free from government regulation or distortion. 
The Appellate Body largely agreed with the panel and with Argentina, finding that the phrase 
“reasonably reflect the costs” means “whether the records kept by the exporter or producer suitably 
and sufficiently correspond to or reproduce those costs incurred by the investigated exporter or 
producer that have a genuine relationship with the production and sale of the specific product under 
consideration.” (para.6.26) For the panel and the Appellate Body, the “reasonably reflect” phrase was 
intended to ensure that the costs were the “actual” cost incurred for the production of the precise 
product at issue. So long as the books and records reflect the amount actually paid –no matter how 
ridiculous that amount might be—that amount must be used. In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate 
Body expressly rejected the EU’s attempt to read into the phrase “reasonably reflect the costs” the 
notion of costs pertaining to the production and sale of biodiesel in “normal circumstances” yet 
accepted reading in the notion of “actual” costs so long as they were reflected in books and records, 
even though the word “actual” does not appear in Article 2.2.1.1. 
There was no dispute that the prices for soybeans in Argentina were distorted, nor any dispute that 
the prices did not reflect the world-wide price for a commodity such as soybeans, yet no room found 
in the ADA not to use them anyway. The Appellate Body interpreted the phrase “reasonably reflect 
the costs” narrowly, focusing largely on whether the costs in a given producer’s books and records 
accurately reflect the cost of producing the particular like product at issue, since many producers may 
                                                     
12
 The Argentines presented an argument against this claim; “CARBIO complained that the Commission did not take into 
account the fact that in the absence of the DET [export tax] in Argentina, the CBOT [international] prices of soya beans 
would have been much lower.” See Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1194/2013 in Official Journal of the 
European Union L 315/6(41) of 26 November 2013. There is likely some truth to this claim. Argentina’s share of the 
global market for soybeans, soybean meal and soybean oil is substantial and growing. In 2001, Argentina’s share of the 
world market for soybeans and soybean meal was 24% (See Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling; 2001, p. 2). By 2016, the 
US Department of Agriculture was forecasting that Argentina would capture half of the world market for soybean meal 
and oil by 2026 (See Lee, Tran, Jansen and Ash; 2016). Together, these facts suggest that Argentina, as a major supplier, 
was able to exert some market power over international prices through its export tax policy.  
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be producing a variety of products in the same facility. As such, for the Appellate Body, the phrase 
“reasonably reflect the costs” was about whether a proper allocation of costs had been made; the 
phrase was not read to encompass a broader notion that books and records can accurately record cost 
figures that are nonetheless “unreasonable” because they are distorted. 
IV. Has the Appellate Body Left Any Room to Address Distorted Prices in Anti-
Dumping Cases? 
As a result of the Appellate Body’s dual findings that use of the alternative COP methodology under 
Article 2.2 for determining Normal Value must: 1) limit the use of outside benchmarks to those which 
“arrive at” the costs inside the country of origin and 2) use the actual costs in the books and records of 
the exporting producer so long as they reflect proper cost allocations, no matter how disconnected they 
may be from international or “real” market prices, the Appellate Body appears to have left little room 
in the ADA to address distorted prices or costs in non-market or other economies in which government 
policies have affected the prices of input material used to produce internationally-traded goods. 
This approach to a strict reading of cost comparisons in the ADA stands in fairly stark contrast to 
the interpretations made with respect to subsidies under the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM). There, for example, a subsidy is deemed to exist if the government 
purchases goods from a domestic producer at a value that is even slightly above the market price for 
that good or provides goods or services to company for a price below market value. And outside 
benchmarks are often used to determine the market prices for goods or services.  
Indeed, the jurisprudence on subsidies leaves little doubt that the existence of a financial 
contribution and a benefit –and hence a subsidy—must be done based on a comparison between a 
market price and the amount of the government contribution. The Panel in Canada — Aircraft found 
that “the only logical basis” for determining whether the financial contribution places the recipient in a 
more advantageous position than it otherwise would have been “is the market.”(para 9.112) According 
to the Panel: “[A] financial contribution will only confer a ‘benefit’, i.e., an advantage, if it is provided 
on terms that are more advantageous than those that would have been available to the recipient on the 
market.”(para 9.112) Hence in the subsidies context, the existence of a market price and the 
determination of that price is a central question for which evidence must be provided. It is not simply 
assumed based on the books and records of any particular company involved. 
With respect to the use of outside benchmarks, the contrast between the Appellate Body’s rejection 
of the Argentine references prices for soybeans used to make biodiesel in the anti-dumping context 
from the Appellate Body’s endorsement in United States – Definitive Anti-dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China (US-Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties) of outside benchmarks for the price of hot-rolled steel is remarkable. In US-Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties, for hot-rolled steel, the Appellate Body stated: “we are of the view that an 
investigating authority may reject in-country private prices if it reaches the conclusion that these are 
too distorted due to the predominant participation of the government as a supplier in the market . . . It 
is, therefore, price distortion that would allow an investigating authority to reject in-country private 
prices, not the fact that the government is the predominant supplier per se. (para. 446). Yet in the 
context of calculating the COP for biodiesel, the Appellate Body accepted the EU’s analysis that the 
private prices were distorted due to government intervention through the export tax scheme, but 
nonetheless severely restricted the EU’s ability to bring in outside benchmarks to correct for such 
distortions. 
While the Appellate Body’s narrow interpretation of the key phrases in Articles 2.2 and 2.2.1.1 of 
the ADA appears to have shut the door on taking market distortions into account when determining 
costs of production, there may be a few windows left open. First, by its terms, the AB report is limited 
to an analysis of the second condition for using records of the exporter (that records “reasonably 
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reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration”) (fn. 120). 
Therefore, the AB leaves open an interpretation of both the first condition for the use of exporter 
records (i.e., that the records are “in accordance with the generally accepting accounting principles of 
the country”), and more importantly, the opening phrase in Art 2.2.1.1, that costs shall normally be 
calculated on the basis of the records . . .” As such, the AB has not ruled on whether distortions, 
particularly in non-market economy countries where separating distorted from non-distorted prices 
may be especially difficult, can rise to the level of creating an abnormal situation such that deviation 
from the norm of relying on exporter records is entirely justified.  
In addition, the EU’s deviation from use of Argentine sales prices was based entirely on its 
unchallenged determination that there were no sales in the ordinary course of trade. As such, this case 
does not address what may be the more difficult question of what is meant by “the particular market 
situation” that would also justify using COP or third country prices in lieu of home market sales 
prices.  
Finally, because Argentina did not challenge the EU determination of a lack of sales in the ordinary 
course of trade, the AB left open the question of the relationship between that lack of ordinary course 
sales and distortions in the market. It is possible that in another case, substantial evidence could be 
developed about why there were no sales that were considered to be in “the ordinary course,” just what 
that “ordinary course” might be in a given market, and what distortions can be seen to arise from a 
lack of sales in that “ordinary course” that would support the use of adjustments to costs under the 
COP or would mean that exporter records reflect an abnormal situation justifying a departure from the 
normal reliance on exporters records. 
Why such a strict reading of the ADA with respect to the COP methodology? In essence, the AB’s 
decision might be interpreted as strong guidance to re-direct the focus of antidumping policy back to 
its original purpose – addressing anticompetitive practices by firms – and away from its growing use 
as a catch-all to offset or correct every type of price distortion that can arise in a non-market or a 
distorted economy. The deeper puzzle in this case is why the EBB and Commission pursued biodiesel 
from Argentina as a dumping case rather than an anti-subsidy case when the evidence suggests that the 
agent ultimately responsible for the low price of exported biodiesel was the Argentine government. 
Perhaps in restricting discretion in COP methodologies for dumping cases, the AB was trying to force 
countries to use anti-subsidy measures when price distortions arise from government action. 
Alternatively, because an econometric analysis would allow an Investigating Authority to construct a 
local input price using local information (rather than information from international or third markets), 
the AB might be encouraging the use of more sophisticated econometric methodologies in trade 
remedy investigations 
V. Alternative approaches to addressing distortions of international prices 
As mentioned previously, the big puzzle in this case is why the EBB and Commission pursued an 
antidumping case rather than an anti-subsidy case. An anti-subsidy case was initiated by the 
Commission in November 2012, approximately six weeks after the anti-dumping case was initiated. 
However, while the dumping case quickly resulted in preliminary results, the anti-subsidy case 
appears to have stagnated before it was ultimately terminated in November 2013, one month after the 
Commission’s definitive dumping determination.  
A. Legal Challenges Faced in Using Subsidies Disciplines 
From a legal standpoint, any effort to turn to subsidies disciplines rather than antidumping 
immediately runs into the narrowing windows through which subsidy cases must fit in light of recent 
Appellate Body decisions making subsidies disciplines harder to use.
 
A successful subsidies case 
involves showing the existence of: 1) a financial contribution, 2) by a government (or public body), 3) 
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which confers a benefit and 4) is specific. (SCM Article 1). Argentina’s export tax, despite the 
significant price distortions it created, does not fit neatly into those four requirements, particularly 
given that the export tax on soybeans resulted in only an indirect effect on biodiesel producers. First, it 
is hard to characterize the export tax as a financial contribution, as it involves a government collection 
of revenue from exporters of soybeans, soybean oil and biodiesel, not the provision of government 
monies to any of those producers. Nor does the export tax result in the provision of a tax exemption 
that might constitute “foregone revenue” and hence a financial contribution. 
Second, to the extent that the export tax could be seen as a financial contribution that confers a 
benefit, it does so by creating market pressures for low prices for soybeans, not a direct provision of 
government support to biodiesel producers. While subsidies can be found where the government has 
provided goods (here, soybeans) for less than adequate remuneration, the Argentine government never 
owned the soybeans and never directly set the prices at which the soybeans would be sold to biodiesel 
producers, making it hard to show that the government itself provided below-cost soybeans to the 
biodiesel producers.  
Similarly, a subsidy can be found if, rather than providing the financial contribution and conferring 
the benefit itself, the government “directs and entrusts” a private body to provide the subsidy in its 
stead. Here too such a showing would be difficult, as it is not clear that the soybean farmers are 
standing in the shoes of the government, nor that they have been directed to sell soybeans to biodiesel 
producers at low prices. Demonstrating such “entrustment and direction” may have been the EU’s best 
option, but obtaining evidence that the Argentine government was acting to ensure that the soybean 
farmers had no option but to sell low-priced soybeans specifically to biodiesel producers and that such 
sales were being made by farmers in lieu of a normal government practice of selling soybeans would 
have been a tall order.
13
  
B. Economic Analysis of the Export Tax as a Subsidy 
An economic analysis of this case should begin with a review of the international markets for biodiesel 
and biodiesel inputs (soybeans and soybean oil) as well as a review of the structure of the markets for 
both products in Europe, Argentina and other relevant locations. Two important observations are a 
starting point: firstly, biodiesel consumption is heavily influenced by a myriad of government 
environmental regulations. It is more expensive than petroleum biodiesel, but many countries require 
that diesel sold to consumers have a minimum share of renewable biodiesel. This leads to different 
demand in different regions as well as for different varieties of biodiesel. Second, the primary input 
into many varieties of biodiesel is soybeans, a commodity that is traded on spot and futures markets. 
Thus, the global market for soybeans fits the classic definition of a competitive market.  
1. Biodiesel markets and government environmental regulation 
The market for biodiesel is driven by government environmental regulation around the world. In 
Argentina, the Commission found that the home market price of biodiesel could not be used as a 
Normal Value because (a) all diesel sold to consumers was regulated to have a biodiesel share of at 
least 7% and (b) the price of this mandated biodiesel purchase was set by the State according to 
complex formula.
14
 In Europe, biodiesel consumption was subject to similar if not more complex 
rules. For example, in addition to the requirement that biodiesel comprise a minimum share (7%) of 
consumer diesel, some Member States of the EU had additional incentives in place to use biodiesel 
                                                     
13
 See Crowley and Palmeter (2009) for a discussion of the difficulty of proving “directs and entrusts” claims in the Korean 
DRAMs case. 
14
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 490/2013 of 27 May 2013, Section 1.1, paragraph (44).  
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manufactured from recycled vegetable oils or animal fats.
15
 Moreover, “In some Member States, quota 
systems are in place that give a particular production quota to companies in that Member State or in 
other Member States across the Union.”16 In sum, it is difficult to present a baseline “market” price for 
biodiesel anywhere in the world. While the EU threw out the regulated, government-set Argentine 
price as not suitable for Normal Value, prices in Europe were also driven by government regulations 
and interventions. 
17
 This implies that it would be sensible to assess dumping using cost data, rather 
than by comparing output prices across markets subject to different distortions.  
2. The market for soybeans and biodiesel inputs 
Raw soybeans are a commodity whose price is determined by the forces of global supply and global 
demand. Argentina is a major world producer of soybeans; in 2001, Argentina’s share of the world 
market for soybeans and soybean meal was 24% (See Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling; 2001, p. 2). 
According to the USDA, over 2002-2015, Argentina’s differential export tax system provided stronger 
incentives for Argentine farmers to produce soybeans over wheat or corn. This led to increased 
acreage for soybeans and made Argentina a dominant player in the global soybean market. (See Lee, 
Tran, Jansen and Ash; 2016). Together, these facts suggest that Argentina, as a major supplier, was 
able to exert some market power over international prices through its export tax policy.  
To understand the full impact of the Argentine export tax on soybeans, we need to know the world 
export supply elasticity. Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008) present the export supply elasticity for 
soybeans facing five countries – China, the Czech Republic, Oman, the Russian Federation and Saudi 
Arabia - at the HS04 level (1201). The average elasticity over these countries is 140, but the range is 
enormous, from a high of 446 (the Russian Federation) to a low of 0.4 (Saudi Arabia). Soderberry 
(2015) shows that the use of different methodologies yields extremely different estimates of the export 
supply elasticity facing the US; the traditional Feenstra/Broda and Weinstein methodology yields an 
estimate consistent with a perfectly elastic export supply curve while Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood finds that the US faces a highly inelastic (0.08) export supply. This wide range of estimates 
highlights how difficult it is to gage the conditions of market competition with standard econometric 
methodologies. The Argentine position was essentially that Argentina faced a somewhat inelastic 
world supply curve while the Europeans assumed a perfectly elastic world supply curve. The evidence 
presented above tends to support the Argentine position, but is far from conclusive. 
A perfectly elastic world supply curve for soybeans would imply full pass through of any 
Argentine export tax to the domestic price. A 10% export tax would induce a 10% decline in the 
domestic price in Argentina and no change in the price of soybeans in Europe. In contrast, a relatively 
inelastic export supply curve combined with a relatively inelastic import demand curve for soybeans in 
foreign markets would imply that the burden of any Argentine export tax would be split between 
Argentine soybean producers and consumers of soybeans in foreign markets. That is, as a large 
supplier of soybeans, Argentina likely had market power that not only reduced the domestic price of 
soybeans for Argentine biodiesel producers, but also drove up the world market price of soybeans for 
European biodiesel producers.  
We can thus conclude that the Argentine export tax led to a large input price decline which 
represented a beneficial cost shock for biodiesel producers. The questions this raises, from the 
perspective of economics, are, firstly, was this beneficial cost shock passed through to the price of 
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 See Commission Regulation (EU) No 490/2013 of 27 May 2013, Section 3.7, paragraphs (143)-(145).  
16
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 490/2013 of 27 May 2013, Section 3.8, paragraphs (150).  
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 The US market is also heavily influenced by government regulation: “According to the U.S. Department of Energy, there 
are reportedly more than 300 state laws, regulations and “funding opportunities” related to biodiesel production and use.” 
USITC, “Biodiesel from Argentina and Indonesia: Investigation Nos. 701-TA-571-572 and 731-TA-1347-1348,” p. I-19, 
May 2017.  
Slamming the door on trade policy discretion? The WTO Appellate Body’s ruling  in EU—Biodiesel (Argentina) 
European University Institute 11 
exported biodiesel, secondly, if so, by how much, and thirdly, does this amount to unfair government 
subsidization of biodiesel producers? A related question is: did the export tax drive up the cost of 
soybeans and soybean oil in Europe, placing European biodiesel producers at a disadvantage relative 
to their Argentine competitors?  
We would expect that the Argentine pricing strategy in response to an input cost shock would 
depend on the elasticity of demand in the output market.
18
 If demand were highly elastic, we would 
expect the firm to pass through low input prices to a low output price and increase its market share. 
This type of behavior would appear consistent with the Article 2.2 definition of dumping. However, if 
demand were relatively inelastic, we would expect the firm to keep its output price high in order to 
extract larger profits. Interestingly, over the investigation period of 2009-2012, the price of 
Argentina’s exported biodiesel rose 54%. At the same time, its market share increased modestly from 
7.6% to 10.8%. These facts suggest that the Argentine firms were likely absorbing the cost advantage 
conferred by the Argentine export tax into a larger profit margin. That is, Argentine biodiesel 
producers would have been able to undercut their European competitors substantially, yet they appear 
to have exploited their market power to capture high profit margins. From an economics perspective, 
the pricing strategy seems to be at odds with traditional definitions of dumping. Rather, the export tax 
on soybeans conferred a financial benefit on biodiesel producers that was similar to a production 
subsidy but had the added benefit of placing European competitors at a cost disadvantage by raising 
the price of soybeans on world markets.
19
 
VI. Conclusion 
The true problem with the export tax on soybeans is that the policy falls into an ambiguous area of 
legal interpretation in which firms’ pricing strategies don’t look like dumping and the government 
intervention doesn’t quite fit the SCM’s definition of a subsidy. However, the policy clearly had a 
harmful effect on import-competing biodiesel producers in Europe. In addition to providing a cost 
advantage to Argentine producers, it seems probable that the export tax directly drove up the costs of 
European producers, placing them at a competitive disadvantage.  
The ultimate question for international economic relations is thus if firms in an importing economy 
are suffering a competitive disadvantage because of a foreign government policy, how should this be 
dealt with at the WTO? Are the WTO’s unfair trade rules capable of neutralizing the distortion on 
world prices? If the existing rules are inadequate for this type of problem – a distortion in a vertically 
integrated industry that benefits an exporter – then what new rules would it be appropriate for the 
WTO to adopt? 
The AB's decision – that the EU regulation violated the WTO rules because a private firm cannot 
be found to have dumped when its only crime was to purchase inputs at the prevailing (but distorted) 
prices in its domestic market – has some merit in following the letter of the law. However, the finding 
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 Broda, Greenfield and Weinstein (2006) provide estimates of import demand elasticities for biodiesel in a number of 
European countries. They place the estimate for HS 151 in Germany at 1.75, in the UK at 2.31 and in France at 7.66. For 
HS 271, their estimates are 5.00, 1.96, and 33, for Germany, the UK and France, respectively.  
19
 To be precise, biodiesel production in Europe uses rapeseed rather than soybeans as its primary feedstock. However, 
soybeans and rapeseed are closely substitutable commodities. This implies that an increase in the price of soybeans on 
world markets places upward pressure on the price of rapeseed, placing EU biodiesel producers at a cost disadvantage. 
According to the USDA: “World oilseed trade consists of many closely substitutable commodities, such as soybeans, 
rapeseed, sunflowerseed, and cottonseed. …The volume and source of foreign imports depends on seasonal availability 
and relative prices, credit and delivery terms, local preferences, and quality.” 
(https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/soybeans-oil-crops/trade/) Similarly, a 2008 report from the European 
Commission highlights the substitutability of rapeseed with imported oilseeds noting that because of increased biodiesel 
production, “EU rapeseed is being diverted from the food market, to be replaced by imported oilseeds and oils.” (De 
Santi, et. al., 2008).  
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also greatly curtails the future discretion of importing countries in trying to develop trade policies to 
address market distortions that are not transparently subsidies or do not confer a direct benefit on the 
domestic producers of the product subject to an investigation. The case points to a short-coming of the 
WTO that will likely become more important over time as trade between Western-style capitalist 
economies and economies with other forms of resource allocation increases.  
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TABLE I: Synopsis of Claims and Findings 
Claim Argentina EU Panel  AB 
ADA 2.2.1.1 EU failed to calculate 
costs on basis of records 
kept by producers; EU is 
required to use actual 
costs incurred in 
Argentina by Argentine 
producers 
Costs in records kept by 
producers were distorted 
by export tax system and 
did not “reasonably reflect 
the costs associated with 
the product . . . “ The EU 
looked to Argentine 
reference price 
(international price) 
instead. 
Violation by failing to 
calculate cost of 
production on basis of 
records kept by producers 
and on basis of actual 
costs to the producers 
Violation = EU determination 
that domestic prices lower than 
international prices due to 
export tax was not, in itself, a 
sufficient basis for concluding 
that producers’ records do not 
reasonably reflect costs or for 
rejecting producers’ books and 
records 
ADA 2.2 Failure to construct NV 
on basis of actual costs 
in Argentina; EU cannot 
use outside prices to 
determine costs in 
Argentina 
Not required to use actual 
costs when costs do not 
reflect reality; requirement 
would break general 
standard of reasonableness; 
EU used prices Argentine 
producers would have paid 
absent distortions 
Violation by using “costs” 
for inputs that was not 
cost prevailing in 
Argentina 
Violation = can use outside 
information but must ensure it 
“arrives at” or “yields” the COP 
in the country of origin; 
surrogate used by EU did not 
represent actual cost of 
soybeans paid by Argentine 
biodiesel producers 
ADA 2.4 Failure to make due 
allowance for 
differences affecting 
price comparability 
Panel correctly found that 
EU made permitted 
allowances for differences 
affecting price 
comparability 
No violation  Unnecessary to rule, although 
disagreed with Panel’s finding of 
a general proposition in EC –
Fasteners (China 21.5) that 
differences arising from 
methodology for NV cannot be 
challenged under ADA 2.4. 
ADA 9.3 Imposing AD duties in 
excess of margins of 
dumping 
Margin of dumping was 
properly calculated using 
the reference price for 
soybean costs 
Violation b/c AD margins 
in excess of what should 
have been if had used 
actual costs 
Violation = duties imposed were 
in excess of margin of dumping 
ADA 3.1 and 
3.5 
EU’s own overcapacity 
to produce biodiesel 
caused the injury, not 
Argentine imports and 
EU improperly adjusted 
its capacity data 
EU’s non-attribution 
analysis was not based on 
or affected by revised 
capacity utilization data. 
No violation No violation = EU calculations 
not tainted by revised data; EU 
conclusion on role of 
overcapacity was proper. 
As such 2(5) 
EU Basic 
Regulation/
2.2.1.1. 
Provision that 
authorities shall reject 
or adjust costs when 
costs reflect prices that 
are “abnormally or 
artificially low”  
2(5) not inconsistent; 
replicates 2.2.1.1 + 
procedures when records to 
not reflect costs 
No violation No violation/no panel error b/c 
EU law does not require use of 
information from other markets 
that does not reflect cost in 
producer market 
As such 2(5) 
EU Basic 
Regulation/
2.2 
Provision permitting 
adjustment “on any 
other reasonable basis, 
including information 
from representative 
markets.” 
Provision permits but does 
not require EU to use costs 
from outside country of 
origin; only applies after 
determination that records 
do not reflect costs 
No violation No violation b/c EU can use 
other information to construct 
costs in manner consistent with 
ADA 
As such 2(5) 
EU Basic 
Regulation 
/Art XVI:4 
Provision permitting 
adjustments on any 
other reasonable basis 
Argentina did not meet its 
burden just by showing 
provision could be applied 
in WTO inconsistent way 
No violation No violation 
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